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Why share in peer-to-peer networks?

Published:19 August 2008Publication History

ABSTRACT

Prior theory and empirical work emphasize the enormous free-riding problem facing peer-to-peer (P2P) sharing networks. Nonetheless, many P2P networks thrive. We explore two possible explanations that do not rely on altruism or explicit mechanisms imposed on the network: direct and indirect private incentives for the provision of public goods. The direct incentive is a traffic redistribution effect that advantages the sharing peer. We find this incentive is likely insufficient to motivate equilibrium content sharing in large networks. We then approach P2P networks as a graph-theoretic problem and present sufficient conditions for sharing and free-riding to co-exist due to indirect incentives we call generalized reciprocity.

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  1. Why share in peer-to-peer networks?

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            cover image ACM Other conferences
            ICEC '08: Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Electronic commerce
            August 2008
            355 pages
            ISBN:9781605580753
            DOI:10.1145/1409540

            Copyright © 2008 ACM

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            New York, NY, United States

            Publication History

            • Published: 19 August 2008

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