Abstract
We consider the problem of designing revenue-maximizing online posted-price mechanisms when the seller has limited supply. A seller has k identical items for sale and is facing n potential buyers (“agents”) that are arriving sequentially. Each agent is interested in buying one item. Each agent’s value for an item is an independent sample from some fixed (but unknown) distribution with support [0,1]. The seller offers a take-it-or-leave-it price to each arriving agent (possibly different for different agents), and aims to maximize his expected revenue.
We focus on mechanisms that do not use any information about the distribution; such mechanisms are called detail-free (or prior-independent). They are desirable because knowing the distribution is unrealistic in many practical scenarios. We study how the revenue of such mechanisms compares to the revenue of the optimal offline mechanism that knows the distribution (“offline benchmark”).
We present a detail-free online posted-price mechanism whose revenue is at most O((k log n)2/3) less than the offline benchmark, for every distribution that is regular. In fact, this guarantee holds without any assumptions if the benchmark is relaxed to fixed-price mechanisms. Further, we prove a matching lower bound. The performance guarantee for the same mechanism can be improved to O(√k log n), with a distribution-dependent constant, if the ratio k/n is sufficiently small. We show that, in the worst case over all demand distributions, this is essentially the best rate that can be obtained with a distribution-specific constant.
On a technical level, we exploit the connection to multiarmed bandits (MAB). While dynamic pricing with unlimited supply can easily be seen as an MAB problem, the intuition behind MAB approaches breaks when applied to the setting with limited supply. Our high-level conceptual contribution is that even the limited supply setting can be fruitfully treated as a bandit problem.
- Ittai Abraham, Omar Alonso, Vasilis Kandylas, and Aleksandrs Slivkins. 2013. Adaptive crowd-sourcing algorithms for the bandit survey problem. In Proceedings of the 26th Conference on Learning Theory.Google Scholar
- Rajeev Agrawal. 1995. The continuum-armed bandit problem. SIAM J. Control Optim. 33, 6, 1926--1951. Google ScholarDigital Library
- J. Y. Audibert and S. Bubeck. 2010. Regret bounds and minimax policies under partial monitoring. J. Machine Learn. Res. 11, 2785--2836. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Peter Auer, Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, and Paul Fischer. 2002a. Finite-time analysis of the multiarmed bandit problem. Machine Learn. 47, 2--3, 235--256. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Peter Auer, Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Yoav Freund, and Robert E. Schapire. 2002b. The nonstochastic multi-armed bandit problem. SIAM J. Comput. 32, 1, 48--77. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Peter Auer, Ronald Ortner, and Csaba Szepesvári. 2007. Improved Rates for the Stochastic Continuum-Armed Bandit Problem. In Proceedings of the 20th Conference on Learning Theory. 454--468. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Shaddin Dughmi, and Yaron Singer. 2011. Posting prices with unknown distributions. In Proceedings of the Symposium on Innovations in CS.Google Scholar
- Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, and Robert Kleinberg. 2007. Matroids, secretary problems, and online mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 18th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. 434--443. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg, and Aleksandrs Slivkins. 2010. Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. 43--52. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Moshe Babaioff, Yogeshwer Sharma, and Aleksandrs Slivkins. 2009. Characterizing truthful multi-armed bandit mechanisms. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. 79--88. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Robert Kleinberg, and Aleksandrs Slivkins. 2013. Bandits with knapsacks. In Proceedings of the 54th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Z. Bar-Yossef, K. Hildrum, and F. Wu. 2002. Incentive-compatible online auctions for digital goods. In Proceedings of the 13th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Omar Besbes and Assaf Zeevi. 2009. Dynamic pricing without knowing the demand function: risk bounds and near-optimal algorithms. Oper. Res. 57, 6, 1407--1420. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Omar Besbes and Assaf Zeevi. 2011. On the minimax complexity of pricing in a changing environment. Oper. Res. 59, 1, 66--79. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Avrim Blum and Jason Hartline. 2005. Near-optimal online auctions. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Avrim Blum, Vijay Kumar, Atri Rudra, and Felix Wu. 2003. Online learning in online auctions. In Proceedings of the 14th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. 202--204. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Sébastien Bubeck and Nicolo Cesa-Bianchi. 2012. Regret analysis of stochastic and nonstochastic multi-armed bandit problems. Found. Trends in Machine Learn. 5, 1, 1--122.Google ScholarCross Ref
- Sébastien Bubeck, Rémi Munos, and Gilles Stoltz. 2011a. Pure exploration in multi-armed bandit problems. Theor. Comput. Sci. 412, 19, 1832--1852. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Sébastien Bubeck, Rémi Munos, Gilles Stoltz, and Csaba Szepesvari. 2011b. Online Optimization in X-Armed Bandits. J. Machine Learn. Res. 12, 1587--1627. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi and Gábor Lugosi. 2006. Prediction, Learning, and Games. Cambridge University Press. Google Scholar
- Tanmoy Chakraborty, Eyal Even-Dar, Sudipto Guha, Yishay Mansour, and S. Muthukrishnan. 2010. Approximation schemes for sequential posted pricing in multi-unit auctions. In Proceedings of the Workshop on Internet & Network Economics. 158--169. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, David L. Malec, and Balasubramanian Sivan. 2010. Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing. In Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing. 311--320. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Nikhil Devanur and Jason Hartline. 2009. Limited and online supply and the Bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism design. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Nikhil Devanur and Sham M. Kakade. 2009. The price of truthfulness for pay-per-click auctions. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. 99--106. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Tim Roughgarden, and Qiqi Yan. 2010. Revenue maximization with a single sample. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. 129--138. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Dynkin, E. B. 1963. Eugene B. Dynkin. 1963. The optimum choice of the instant for stopping a markov process. Sov. Math. Dokl. 4.Google Scholar
- John Gittins, Kevin Glazebrook, and Richard Weber. 2011. Multi-Armed Bandit Allocation Indices. John Wiley & Sons.Google Scholar
- J. C. Gittins. 1979. Bandit processes and dynamic allocation indices (with discussion). J. Roy. Statist. Soc. Ser. B 41, 148--177.Google Scholar
- Ashish Goel, Sanjeev Khanna, and Brad Null. 2009. The ratio index for budgeted learning, with applications. In Proceedings of the 20th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. 18--27. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Mohammad T. Hajiaghayi, Robert Kleinberg, and David C. Parkes. 2004. Adaptive limited-supply online auctions. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. 71--80. Google ScholarDigital Library
- J. D. Hartline and T. Roughgarden. 2008. Optimal mechanism design and money burning. In Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Robert Kleinberg. 2004. Nearly tight bounds for the continuum-armed bandit problem. In Proceedings of the 18th Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems.Google Scholar
- Robert Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Slivkins, and Eli Upfal. 2008. Multi-armed bandits in metric spaces. In Proceedings of the 40th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing. 681--690. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Robert D. Kleinberg and Frank T. Leighton. 2003. The value of knowing a demand curve: bounds on regret for online posted-price auctions. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Tze Leung Lai and Herbert Robbins. 1985. Asymptotically efficient adaptive allocation rules. Adv. Appl. Math. 6, 4--22. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Ron Lavi and Noam Nisan. 2000. Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. 233--241. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Colin McDiarmid. 1998. Concentration. In Probabilistic Methods for Discrete Mathematics, M. Habib. C. McDiarmid. J. Ramirez and B. Reed (Eds.), Springer, 195--248.Google Scholar
- Michael Mitzenmacher and Eli Upfal. 2005. Probability and Computing: Randomized Algorithms and Probabilistic Analysis. Cambridge University Press. Google ScholarDigital Library
- R. B. Myerson. 1981. Optimal auction design. Math. Operations Res. 6, 1, 58--73.Google ScholarDigital Library
- Hamid Nazerzadeh, Amin Saberi, and Rakesh Vohra. 2008. Dynamic cost-per-action mechanisms and applications to online advertising. In Proceedings of the 17th International World Wide Web Conference. Google ScholarDigital Library
- Aleksandrs Slivkins. 2011. Contextual bandits with similarity information. In Proceedings of the 24th Conference on Learning Theory.Google Scholar
- Aleksandrs Slivkins and Eli Upfal. 2008. Adapting to a changing environment: The Brownian restless bandits. In Proceedings of the 21st Conference on Learning Theory. 343--354.Google Scholar
- Robert B. Wilson. 1989. Efficient and competitive rationing. Econometrica 57, 1--40.Google ScholarCross Ref
- Qiqi Yan. 2011. Mechanism design via correlation gap. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms. Google ScholarDigital Library
Index Terms
- Dynamic Pricing with Limited Supply
Recommendations
Dynamic pricing with limited supply
EC '12: Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic CommerceWe consider the problem of designing revenue maximizing online posted-price mechanisms when the seller has limited supply. A seller has k identical items for sale and is facing n potential buyers ("agents") that are arriving sequentially. Each agent is ...
Dynamic and Nonuniform Pricing Strategies for Revenue Maximization
† Special Section on the Fiftieth Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2009)We consider the item pricing problem for revenue maximization, where a single seller with multiple distinct items caters to multiple buyers with unknown subadditive valuation functions who arrive in a sequence. The seller sets the prices on individual items, ...
Repeated Sales with Multiple Strategic Buyers
EC '17: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and ComputationIn a market with repeated sales of a single item to a single buyer, prior work has established the existence of a zero revenue perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the absence of a commitment device for the seller. This counter-intuitive outcome is the ...
Comments